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EVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET 
Fred S. McChesney* 
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
REFORM. By Susan Rose-Ackerman. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 266. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95. 
This I tell ya, brother, you can't have one without the other . . . .  
Try, try, try to separate them, it's an illusion. 
Try, try, try and you will only come to this conclusion. 
- Frank Sinatra1 
Instinctively, corruption is deplorable. Nobody likes private citi­
zens paying governmental officials for special favors. Few have de­
plored corruption longer or in greater detail than economist Susan 
Rose-Ackerman. 2 
In Corruption and Government, Professor Rose-Ackerman dis­
cusses how corruption starts ("causes"), why it is bad ("conse­
quences"), and how to stop it ("reform"), principally from an eco­
nomic perspective.3 Professor Rose-Ackerman's interest in corruption 
derives partly from her outside work with international agencies, es­
pecially time spent at the World Bank - "a transformative experi­
ence" (p. xi). Her twenty-two page bibliography ranges across sources 
in economics and politics, plus many documents from the World Bank 
and other international groups. 
Causes, consequences, and reform constitute a sensible approach 
to analyzing corruption. One must first know the reasons for and ef­
fects of corruption before advancing any convincing prescription for 
correcting it. The book does not divide itself quite so neatly along 
those three lines. Causes, consequences, and reforms are intermingled 
in many chapters, as the book cycles through all three. Ultimately, 
* Class of 196 7 James B. Haddad Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; 
Professor, Department of Management & Strategy, Kellogg School of Management. A.B. 
1970, Holy Cross College; J.D. 1978, University of Miami; Ph.D. 1982 (Economics), Univer­
sity of Virginia. - Ed. Tamara Shields provided helpful research assistance. 
1. Sammy Cahn & Jimmy Van Heusen, Love and Marriage (ASCAP) (popularized by 
Frank Sinatra in 1955), at http://www.spiritofsinatra.com (last visited May 1, 2001). 
2. Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale University. 
3. "Economics is a powerful tool for the analysis of corruption. Cultural differences and 
morality provide nuance and subtlety, but an economic approach is fundamental to under­
standing where corrupt incentives are the greatest and have the biggest impact." P. xi. 
1348 
May 2001] Corruption and Government 1349 
however, the reader understands well what Professor Rose-Ackerman 
sees as corruption's causes, costs, and cures. 
In Part I, I use Professor Rose-Ackerman's tripartite division to 
summarize briefly her analysis of corruption. As I hope to show, there 
is much of interest and value in her analysis. Part II, however, explains 
that what she means by the single term "corruption" actually encom­
passes different phenomena with varying economic and legal implica­
tions. Some corruption is economically bad and illegal. Some is 
economically bad, but legal. And some is actually economically desir­
able, albeit illegal. Corruption turns out to be a more subtle phenome­
non than Corruption and Government portrays it. 
To foreshadow these points, consider four examples. Jewish free­
dom fighters in 1943 pay German soldiers to smuggle arms into the 
Warsaw Ghetto and smuggle Jews out.4 At a time and place where 
abortion is illegal, doctors selling abortions pay government officials 
not to stop them. A politician takes campaign contributions from a 
constituent seeking a lucrative government contract and orders her 
staff to help the constituent get the contract. Politicians allow illegal 
transvestite reviews to take place in exchange for the organizers' pay­
ing for causes that the politicians choose.5 
All of these examples entail corruption, as Professor Rose­
Ackerman (and most others, probably) would define it.6 But as in­
stinctive reactions to these examples indicate - and, I will argue, as a 
more formal matter of economics - some corruption is actually good. 
In proposing truly useful reforms, one must distinguish good from bad 
corruption. 
The examples also illustrate a point developed in Part III of this 
Review. When all is said, corruption is fundamentally a function of the 
4. See, e.g., DAN KURZ MAN, THE BRAVEST BATTLE: THE TwENTY-EIGHT DAYS OF 
THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING (1976); JOHN HERSEY, THE WALL (1950); Gary s. 
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforc­
ers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1974) (discussing bribes paid to Nazis by Jews). 
5. The following describes the transvestite "Miss All-America Camp Beauty Pageant" 
and similar drag beauty contests of the 1960 s. 
The organizer was Jack Doroshow, also known as Sabrina, who held 46 contests a year 
from 1959 to 196 7 through his company, the Nationals Academy, which in its heyday had 100 
employees on the payroll. 
Mainstream America didn't know it, but the nation had a flourishing drag subculture, and 
not just in the major cities . . . .  
Since local laws often prohibited cross-dressing, Mr. Doroshow would meet with officials 
and propose a donation to some unspecified charity. In return, the town would pass a vari­
ance allowing the contest to take place. 
William Grimes, The Queen' on the Runway Again, N. Y. TIMES, March 27, 1993, at 13. 
6 .  Professor Rose-Ackerman does not use these specific examples, but they fall under 
what I understand to be her definition of corruption. 
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size and power of government.7 This creates ambivalence and tension 
for international agencies that adopt a policy of limiting corruption. 
The agencies' principal function - providing financial support to na­
tional governments - increases the size and power of those govern­
ments, and thus facilitates corruption. These last points are largely ig­
nored in Professor Rose-Ackerman's book. 
I do not claim that governments and international agencies never 
do good things, or that reducing truly harmful corruption is undesir­
able. My claim is only that not all corruption is harmful economically, 
and even if it were, international agencies' role in corruption cannot 
be brushed over. 
I. CAUSES, COSTS, AND CORRECTION OF CORRUPTION 
The length of Professor Rose-Ackerman's bibliography attests to 
the fascination that corruption holds for many.8 Nonetheless, by rush­
ing into this trove of material the book never fully defines what cor­
ruption is. It is said to be a type of "rent seeking," in which private 
producers and politicians "gain an advantage in dividing up the bene­
fits of economic activity" (p. 2; citations omitted). Corruption "de­
scribes a relationship between the state and the private sector. . . .  The 
relative bargaining power of these groups determines both the overall 
impact of corruption on society and the distribution of the gains be­
tween bribers and bribees" (p. 113). 
However, she says, not all payments to government officials are 
bribes; some are merely gifts. "The definition of bribes and gifts is a 
cultural matter" (p. 1 10) . "[C]orruption has different meanings in dif­
ferent societies" (p. 5). And because " 'culture' is dynamic and con­
stantly changing" (p. 1 10), what constitutes corruption must be, too. 
In her concluding chapter (pp. 225-29), Professor Rose-Ackerman 
seems to have settled on dictatorial kleptomania plus outright bribery 
7. "Size and power" refer, respectively, to the number of economic domains over which 
government has authority and the amount of authority it has within those domains. 
"Authority," in turn, refers to the de facto ability of government to control economic activ-
� 
. . 
8. Pp. 230-52. Other economic analyses of corruption could be added to the bibliogra­
phy. E.g. , James Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, 24 EGON. INQUIRY 
243 (1985); Bruce L. Benson, Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of the 
"Tragedy of the Commons" Arising with Public Allocation Processes, 8 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 73 (1988); Bruce L. Benson & John Baden, The Political Economy of Governmental 
Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1985); Steven 
N. S. Cheung, A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption, 14 CONTEMP. ECON. 
PoL'Y, July 1996 , at 1; Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, Cheap Bribes and the Corrup­
tion Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, 78 PUB. CHOICE 305 (1994). 
Articles appearing after the Rose-Ackerman book are Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, 
The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 194 (2000); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shave!!, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. PUB. 
ECON. 1 (2001). 
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of lower government officials as the definition of corruption.9 Part of 
the definitional haziness stems from the book's almost exclusive focus 
on corruption in developing countries. For example, the book details 
the remarkable extent of and sheer brazenness with which autocrats 
("kleptocrats") in some countries plunder their treasuries and their 
citizenry (pp. 116-17). Given Professor Rose-Ackerman's background 
and interest in the underdeveloped world, her concentration on modes 
of corruption there is hardly surprising. 
But autocratic theft and crude bribery are not the usual way that 
private interests and government officials transact in more developed 
societies. Most frequently, American politicians obtain money from 
private citizens from campaign donations and the like, in exchange for 
"access" to the politician. Is this corruption? Professor Rose­
Ackerman's book does not say it is, although other developed-world 
sources certainly believe it is.10 Similarly, do union endorsements and 
financial support amount to corruption when given in exchange for a 
politician's support for raising the minimum wage? Nothing in Cor­
ruption and Government helps answer that question.11 
9. "In a corrupt relationship both the briber and the recipient are better off, but the 
transaction violates government policy." P. 225. The definition of corruption as kleptomania 
plus bribery parallels Professor Rose-Ackerman's definition of corruption elsewhere: "Cor­
ruption is the misuse of public office for private gain. The structure of the state creates 
pockets of monopoly power where politicians and civil servants have discretionary power. 
Officials can use the power to enrich themselves." Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and 
Democracy, 90 ASIL PROC. 83, 83 (1996). 
10. Common Cause recently opined that, in America, 
corporations, unions, and wealthy givers know that big money can result in extraordinary ac­
cess and influence for their interests. Today, in Washington, if you want to be heard, it's 
much easier if you have a big soft money check that can help pave the way . . . .  [T]he soft 
money system taints everyone in it - the givers, the candidates, and the parties . . . .  
[T]hanks to soft money, the public now sees parties largely for what they, sadly, have be­
come: mail drops for special interest money. 
Press Release, Common Cause, A Message from Scott Harshbarger (May 7, 2000) (on file 
with author). 
11 .  To focus solely on the blatant corruption in less-developed countries is to miss much 
of what corruption and government are really all about. Analytically, corruption is corrup­
tion. Anywhere. Depradations of tinhoms like the Marcoses are lamentable, but Ferdinand's 
squirreled-away millions and all of Imelda's shoes together add up to just a few days' honest 
(or legal) take for major politicians in the wealthier, First-World countries. One can snicker 
about petty border shakedowns by uniformed foreign customs officials, but how is the epi­
sode of the "Miss All-America Camp Beauty Pageant" any different? See Grimes, supra 
note 5. Corruption may be overt, as when a foreign kleptocrat demands money from private 
investors in his country, lest he otherwise seize (nationalize) their firms' assets. It may be 
more subtle, as when American politicians about to run for re-election squeeze money from 
tobacco companies to mail out to their constituents. 
Just weeks ahead of the fall elections, Illinois officials on Thursday· began mailing out the 
first checks under a $280 million property tax rebate program . . . .  
The checks, funded by windfall revenue the state received as part of a legal settlement with 
the tobacco industry, will range from about $25 to as much as $300 for homeowners, de­
pending on how much they pay in property taxes. 
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A. Causes of Corruption 
Professor Rose-Ackerman divides the causes of corruption into 
economic, cultural, and political problems (respectively, Parts I - III 
of the book). The distinction, however, is not particularly compelling; 
as noted above, she believes corruption's explanation lies in econom­
ics. Even the discussion of corruption as a political problem (Part III) 
is more about economics than about politics. 
Economically, Professor Rose-Ackerman argues, corruption arises 
for the same reason payments are made in private markets. Govern­
ment officials have something to sell for which private citizens are 
willing to pay (pp. 3-4). Bureaucrats sell import and export licenses (p. 
11), access to government-controlled credit (p. 10), installation of 
telephones by state-controlled monopolies (p. 15), and relief from 
taxes and customs duties (pp. 19-21). 
Indeed, from the book's recital of transactions, everything that 
government has or does may lead to corruption. It is all a matter of 
government property rights.12 Politicians and bureaucrats have some­
thing of salable value to private citizens.13 Markets happen, be they 
black markets or (legal) widget markets. So why do or should we care 
more about payments to politicians than those to widget makers? 
B. Consequences of Corruption 
Corruption is bad, for many reasons. It is "associated with lower 
levels of investment and growth" (p. 2). It causes politicians and bu­
reaucrats to favor "excessive public infrastructure investment."14 Of­
ten, "corruption breeds more corruption and discourages legitimate 
business investment" (p. 3).  
Corruption not only is bad, it is always bad. On that, Professor 
Rose-Ackerman is uncompromising: there is no good corruption. I 
discuss this point in Part II, where I present more of the reasons Pro­
fessor Rose-Ackerman gives for the unalloyed malignancy of corrup­
tion. 
Ray Long, U.S. Will Tax Your State Tax Rebate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2000, § 1, at 1 .  
12 .  "We define government corruption as  the sale by government officials of  govern­
ment property for personal gain." Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. 
ECON. 599, 599 (1993). 
13. "Corruption is a consequence of discretionary political authority. All governments 
vest in officials discretionary control over some property . . . .  " Benson & Baden, supra note 
8, at 394. 
14. P. 3. As discussed below, "excessive infrastructure" is a deceptively simple expres­
sion, one implicating important problems about international agency activities. See infra Part 
III, text accompanying notes 46-51 .  
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C. Correction of Corruption 
Professor Rose-Ackerman proposes a variety of reforms for the 
corruption she details. That they are predictable reforms does not di­
minish their potential value. We should eliminate programs in which 
corruption is entrenched (pp. 39-42). Outright elimination, however, is 
a last resort. "Many regulatory and spending programs have strong 
justifications and ought to be reformed, and not eliminated" (p. 44). 
Tax and customs collections could be simplified; regulation and social­
benefit programs could be reformed to eliminate potential for corrup­
tion (pp. 44-48). Reform of government procurement laws, obviously 
rife with potential for corruption, is discussed at length (pp. 59-68). 
Front and center is reform of the civil service in underdeveloped 
nations, a subject occupying all of the book's Chapter Five. "Countries 
emerging from a period one-party or authoritarian rule face the chal­
lenge of creating a professional civil service" (p. 69), "professional" 
meaning resistant to bribery. But how to reform entrenched bureauc­
racies? Most frequently, Professor Rose-Ackerman advocates in­
creased pay: "If public sector pay is very low, corruption is a survival 
strategy" (p. 72). 
Despite the book's frequent calls for better bureaucratic pay, how­
ever, Professor Rose-Ackerman seems uncertain how much this will 
really help. After advocating leveling off the difference between pub­
lic- and private-sector salaries, she notes: "One should be careful, 
however, not to exaggerate the public-private disparity. In most cases 
total remuneration [for bureaucrats] includes not just formal wages 
but also perks such as housing or health care" (p. 72). She then adds 
that achieving whatever salary leveling is appropriate may be difficult 
by itself. 
The strain of reform can be reduced by complementary policies to 
create jobs in the private sector and to encourage businesses to come out 
from underground. A good start might focus on the creation of an honest 
tax collection system . . . .  One might then follow by cutting the civil 
service as private sector growth permits. Unfortunately, growth itself will 
cause its own problem - because existing corrupt officials will seek a 
share of the new wealth by imposing new restrictions on private firms. 
This problem may require unorthodox solutions . . . .  [p. 74] 
Cleaning corruption's stables clearly will be a Herculean task. 
Professor Rose-Ackerman recognizes that reform will not be easy: 
"One of the most vexing issues for reformers is determining when in­
cumbent politicians and bureaucrats have an incentive to change" (p. 
226). But she seems confident that a "hard look at regulatory laws to 
see which can be eliminated, which can be simplified . . .  and which re­
quire improved enforcement" can succeed (p. 227). 
One plausible alternative to corrupt government is privatization of 
government enterprises and functions. If corruption depends on gov-
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ernment officials having de facto property rights over goods and serv­
ices, stripping them of those rights by shifting resources to the private 
sector would seem advisable. Privatization would take money away 
from the kleptocrats and would reduce the favors bureaucrats have to 
sell. 
But Professor Rose-Ackerman is only lukewarm at best about pri­
vatizing, and more often negative. If privatization occurs in a klep­
tocracy, she objects, the kleptocrat may simply privatize by selling the 
industry to himself or his family (p. 118). He may not be able to com­
mit credibly not to tax the private enterprise inordinately, making the 
firm worthless if privatized. "Furthermore, even if he can somehow 
write binding contracts with investors, they may worry that a corrupt 
ruler risks overthrow" (p. 118). 
In fact, Professor Rose-Ackerman continues, privatization would 
add to corruption, not correct it. Privatizing presents numerous oppor­
tunities for bureaucratic corruption, including insider trading by public 
officials and payments by newly privatized firms for special treatment 
(e.g., tax breaks) (pp. 35-38). Professor Rose-Ackerman's bottom line: 
"Corruption reduces the revenue-raising benefits of privatization and 
the award of concessions. Firms that retain monopoly power through 
bribery and favoritism undermine the efficiency benefits of turning 
over state firms to private owners" (p. 38). So, in the end, Professor 
Rose-Ackerman's corruption-correction program relies on improving 
government, rather than implementing changes that would diminish 
the role of government in the economy. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption and Government commendably stimulates readers to 
consider corruption from an economic perspective. Given the impreci­
sion with which corruption is sometimes defined, it is useful to start 
with the fundamentals. Economically, two sorts of corruption may be 
distinguished - purely political corruption and public-private corrup­
tion, the latter referring to two different things. 
A. Purely Political Corruption 
Some corruption is simply theft from the public till by politicians 
or bureaucrats. Normatively, there is no case for government theft.15 
Positively, it can be analyzed like any other theft. Its incidence is a 
positive function of the benefits of crime (the expected amount that 
can be stolen), and a negative function of the expected costs (deter-
15. Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and Benefits of Crime, 13 l]'IT'L REV. L. 
& ECON. 225, 228 (1993). 
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mined by the probability of being caught and the penalties meted out) 
to the criminal.16 
Professor Rose-Ackerman, in discussing kleptocracy, refers to this 
sort of corruption, which I will call "purely public corruption." She 
rightly condemns purely public corruption (pp. 114-21), and no further 
discussion is needed here. Dictatorship is bad, whether evaluated as a 
social, political, or economic phenomenon.17 
Professor Rose-Ackerman, however, omits one essential point in 
her discussion � the size of the public fisc to which kleptocratic dicta­
tors can help themselves. The economics of crime (including klepto­
cratic theft) start with the benefits available. Anything that increases 
the size of the dictator's, politician's, or bureaucrats ' expected take 
will increase the amount of kleptocratic and government taking, an is­
sue considered below. 
B. Public-Private Corruption 
Looting the treasury is a purely governmental. affair. The treasury 
exists and government officials take part of it.18 A second form of cor­
ruption, "public-private" corruption, entails payments to government 
officials by private actors. The more government officials have to sell, 
the more private parties will buy. 
Unlike purely public corruption, public-private corruption is not 
categorically bad. The notion of "good corruption" may be counter­
intuitive, and Professor Rose-Ackerman rejects it completely. But a 
better understanding of public-private corruption shows that some 
corruption is indeed beneficial. 
1. Bad Public-Private Corruption: Rent Seeking 
Economists call bad corruption rent seeking - special interests 
seeking special favors ("rents").19 One routinely finds politicians dol­
ing out favorable treatment to particular persons or industries.20 Pay-
16. The work on this subject is vast. The seminal work is Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For a recent summary, 
see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of 
Law, 38 l ECON. LIT. 45 (2000). 
17. Uzi Segal, Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad, 108 J. POL. ECON. 
569 (2000). 
18. The treasury may exist because money had been taken previously from private par­
ties, for example by taxation, but in this first sort of corruption the source of the money 
makes no difference. 
19. For a good introduction and extended bibliography by the lawyer-economist who 
first analyzed rent seeking, see GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1993). 
20. E.g. , Bruce Ingersoll, Sugar Producers Get $1.6 Billion of Federal Help, WALL ST. J., 
May 15, 2000, at B4: 
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ments for special favors are certainly corruption as Professor Rose­
Ackerman would define it.21 
However, the favors-for-pay sequence often is perfectly legal. In 
America, no law stops a politician from accepting - indeed, from so­
liciting - money in exchange for constituents getting a chance to pre­
sent their views to him. Nothing prevents private interests from con­
tributing to have a chance to present their views. In fact, the process is 
constitutionally protected,22 subject to regulations that do not prevent 
politicians from raising sums unimaginable a generation ago. 
This phenomenon presents a problem for analysts of corruption. 
Unquestionably, rent seeking is economically undesirable: "Talented 
people concentrate their effort on rent seeking rather than on produc­
tive activities" (p. 213). On the other hand, it is indubitably legal, in 
various forms in various countries. In underdeveloped countries, 
Professor Rose-Ackerman says, the payments are often called "gifts," 
and we should respect local custom that views gifts to politicians an 
acceptable part of the culture.23 In our developed country, we call 
them PAC donations - pretending that these are really gifts, rather 
than money for favors. 
But if the gift exchanges are legal, and if, as Professor Rose­
Ackerman says, we should respect local notions of what is legal, there 
is little for an economist to complain or write about. To the extent that 
corruption, albeit economically bad, is legal rent seeking, there is 
nothing new in Corruption and Government. Professor Rose­
Ackerman merely advocates Third World legal reform to require re­
porting of gifts (p. 110), ignoring the utter impuissance of reporting 
laws in the developed world to stop rent seeking. 
U.S. sugar producers reap about $1.6 billion a year from a shaky federal price-support 
program that the Clinton Administration just shored up with a big sugar-buying spree. 
The government has long kept U.S. sugar prices far above the world market price by cur­
tailing imports of lower-cost sugar and sticking consumers with the price-support tab in the 
form of higher sugar, candy and soft-drink prices . . . .  
. . . Since 1981, sugar refineries, food makers and consumers have been paying inflated prices 
for raw cane sugar, refined sugar and sweetened food products. Two years ago, the total bill 
amounted to $2.2 billion, up 29% from 1996, the GAO says. 
Dairy farmers and tobacco growers, among others, have received special compensation 
for low prices or crop losses. Sugar producers deserve the same "compassion," Jack Roney, 
an American Sugar Alliance spokesman, says. 
21. E.g., pp. 2, 147, 213; see supra text accompanying note 9. 
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) . 
23. E.g., pp. 5, 110. 
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2. Good Public-Private Corruption: Rent Extraction 
Much of the corruption described in Professor Rose-Ackerman's 
book involves payments known as "rent extraction" or "wealth extrac­
tion."24 As with rent seeking, rent extraction is an economic term with 
which Professor Rose-Ackerman is familiar. But the book ignores a 
fundamental implication of the rent extraction model: in the real 
world of public-private interactions, corruption can be good.25 
Rent extraction is to rent seeking as tort is to contract. With rent 
seeking, private and public parties have an extralegal contract that 
makes both better off.26 The politician has the money and the con­
stituent has the favor. With rent extraction, however, the public­
private interchange is akin to tortious extortion or blackmail: the pri­
vate party is paying not to be made worse off. For example, President 
and Mrs. Clinton's threats in 1993 to impose price controls on the 
health care industry - proposed but ultimately abandoned - gener­
ated a flood of private money for politicians not to legislate. The New 
York Times reported in late 1993: 
As Congress prepares to debate drastic changes in the nation's health 
care system, its members are receiving vast campaign contributions from 
the medical industry, an amount apparently unprecedented for a non­
election year. While it remains unclear who would benefit and who 
would suffer under whatever health plan is ultimately adopted, it is ap­
parent that the early winners are members of Congress.27 
"Your money or your life" is the back-alley equivalent of political rent 
extraction. Private parties surrender money to politicians rather than 
lose something of even greater value. 
The payments, however, can be benign. Price controls are extraor­
dinarily costly to society economically (whatever their benefits to poli­
ticians pushing them), and paying off legislators not to impose them is 
economically beneficial overall. The payments to politicians to avoid 
price controls must be less than the costs to payors, or the payments 
would not be made.28 In general, payoffs (corruption) are good or bad 
24. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Creation and 
Rent Extraction in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). 
25. For a more detailed discussion, see Fred S. McChesney, 'Pay to Pay' Politics Exam­
ined, with Lessons for Campaign-Finance Return, 6 INDEP. REV. (forthcoming 2001). 
26. The contract is extralegal in that, although legal, it is not enforceable in court. See 
MCCHESNEY, supra note 24, at 86-109. 
27. Neil A. Lewis, Medical Industry Showers Congress with Lobby Money, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 1993, at Al. 
28. The economics of rent extraction are more complicated. For example, if the private 
payments are just transfers, they entail no economic costs. Also, the social-welfare costs 
from the process are not the same as the amount payors would lose if the threatened legisla­
tion were passed. But none of this is germane here. 
1358 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1348 
depending on whether the political action forestalled was bad or good. 
If abortion is illegal, the abortionist's payments to politicians to have 
abortions continue wm be evaluated as good by pro-choice advocates, 
bad by pro-life partisans;  
Finally, much rent .extracting,corruption is legal. Politicians' selling 
relief from onerous taxes may be bad or good, depending whether the 
tax is good or bad.29 But it is legal corruption, practiced routinely in 
America by politicians on the House Ways and Means and Senate Fi­
nance Committees.30 As one member of the House observed: "The 
only reason it isn't considered bribery is that Congress gets to define 
bribery."31 American culture today includes these legal gifts made 
during congressional tax sessions. 
C. Corruption and Government Property Rights 
Professor Rose-Ackerman doubtless appreciates the distinctions 
between rent seeking and rent extraction. Chapter Four (economi­
cally, the most analytic of the book) begins: "Corrupt incentives exist 
because state officials have the power to allocate scarce benefits and 
impose onerous costs" (p. 39). Any difference between rent seeking 
and rent extraction seems unimportant to her, however, because either 
will provoke corruption: "In practice, the distinction between active 
[initiating] and passive corruption and between extortion and bribery 
means little because both parties must agree before corruption can oc­
cur" (p. 53). 
This statement is true, but economically irrelevant. It means that 
all corruption should be suppressed, regardless whether it is good or 
bad. The very occurrence of paid-for agreements between private and 
public figures constitutes corruption, however benign their economic 
consequences. 
The unbending focus on public-private transactions, rather than 
their welfare implications, means that the book skirts the real source 
of both rent-seeking and rent-extracting corruption: the size and 
power of government. Whether the .  corruption complained of is pay­
ment for special favors (bad corruption) or corruption to avoid impo­
sition of even greater costs (good corruption), the corruption problem 
29. The attitude toward taxes in Corruption and Government is quite ambivalent. In 
places it is recognized that taxes are imposed for inappropriate reasons or are inappropri­
ately onerous, pp. 51-52, yet payments to avoid inappropriate or overly burdensome taxes 
are also decried, pp. 16-17. 
30. E.g. , JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 
(1987); see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Con­
gress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987) (reviewing BIRNBAUM 
& MURRAY, supra). 
31.  David Maraniss, PAC Heaven: Commerce Committee Members Roll Up Corporate 
Contributions, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1983, at Al. 
May 2001] Corruption and Government 1359 
is defined by the government, problem. 6ov�rnments that have the 
size and power to award special favors1 and impose special costs are 
governments that, by definition, will cause the greatest amount of cor­
ruption. As one economist writes, "[c]orruption is a direct conse­
quence of discretionary authority by government officials."32 
Typically, then, an economist evaluates corruption relative to gov­
ernmental action. Corruption, like practically everything else in life 
(including government), has costs and benefits. Those costs and bene­
fits are the flip side of the government policy causing it. Some gov­
ernment power may be good, some is bad. So, corruption can be bad 
or good, depending on the nature of the cause. When government is 
wrong, working around its errors must be good. When government is 
right, circumventing its edicts is bad. Concerning government regula­
tion, a frequent subject in Corruption and Government, economist 
Steven Cheung summarizes the view "apparently shared by most 
economists": 
[C]orruption generally is good, though sometimes not so good. It is good 
because most regulations and controls move the market away from Pa­
reto optimality. Corruption will then cause a move back toward the Pa­
reto condition. Some regulations, however, are good because they move 
the economy closer to Pareto optimality. Given good regulations, corrup­
tion moves the market away from efficiency. Therefore, some corruption 
is good, and some is bad. With bad regulations, corruption is good. With 
good regulations, corruption is bad.33 
But in Corruption and Government, all corruption is bad precisely 
because it circumvents government. Professor Rose-Ackerman's devo­
tion to incumbent government sometimes seems unquestioning. 
Whatever the government does defines the public interest. In her con­
clusion, she writes: 
Self-interest and the public interest frequently conflict. In a corrupt 
relationship both the briber and the recipient are better off, but the 
transaction violates government policy. A criterion other than willing­
ness to pay is supposed to prevail. [p. 225] 
Automatic equation of "public interest" and "government policy" is 
incorrect. The two are often diametrically opposed. This fact is par­
ticularly true in the countries on which Professor Rose-Ackerman fo­
cuses.34 
32. Benson, supra note 8, at 74. 
33. Cheung, supra note 8, at 1 .  
34. There are passages in  the book in which Professor Rose-Ackerman acknowledges 
the existence of beneficial corruption, if only implicitly. "Citizen concerns over bribes paid in 
return for favors indicate that people recognize norms of fair dealing and competent admini­
stration and are beginning to demand that government serve general public purposes." P. 
225. But an analysis of corruption and government cannot have it both ways. Either govern­
ment is or is not serving the public interest, and if the latter, corruption may be beneficial. 
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In making her, goal the suppression 1of all corruption, not just eco­
nomically deleterious corruption, Professor Rose-Ackerman clearly 
disagrees with economists who would approach the subject in standard 
cost-benefit terms. She admits many analysts believe bribes "have de­
sirable incentive properties."35 She dismisses such claims at the outset 
(pp. 16-26), before getting to the details of Third-World corruption 
that make up the bulk of the book. Her refutation consists of four ar­
guments. 
First, good corruption begets bad corruption. Even if some corrup­
tion were good, permitting it "may encourage its spread to other areas 
with harmful consequences" (p. 16). The reasoning is circular, since 
she claims all corruption is bad to start with. No evidence is provided, 
either, that allowing good corruption increases bad corruption. Why 
wouldn't good corruption breed even more good corruption? 
Second, the book continues, corruption occurs secretly, therefore 
inefficiently; "if bribes do serve a valid resource allocation function, 
they should be legalized, and the fees made public" (p. 26). But to say 
corruption is bad because it is illegal and therefore must occur clan­
destinely begs the questions: Why is the activity illegal in the first 
place? Why should it be? The problem of secretiveness merely reflects 
the state of the law. If the law is bad, then the corruption - however 
clandestine - can be good. 
Consider the example of bribes paid by Jews to get weapons into 
and people out of the Warsaw Ghetto. It occurred secretly, of course, 
because it was illegal and highly dangerous. Yet, surely, this is good 
corruption. As Gary Becker and George Stigler write, "bribes that re­
duced the effectiveness . . . of the laws in Nazi Germany against 
Jews . . .  would improve, not harm, social welfare (although not as de­
fined by the legislature). "36 
Just as surely, to return to Professor Rose-Ackerman's first argu­
ment, successful attempts to buy one's way out of the Ghetto fostered 
further attempts by others: good corruption provoked more of the 
same. The Warsaw Ghetto is an extreme example, but the point is ap­
plicable in many contexts. Abortions occurred illegally and therefore 
secretly in the United States for most of our history. Were the pay­
ments necessary to keep abortionists in business good or bad corrup­
tion? That they were made secretly tells one nothing other than that 
they were illegal. 
The book's third and fourth reasons why corruption is always bad 
focus on the effects produced on the briber and bribee. On the briber 
side, "corruption can contribute to an uncertain business climate" (p. 
35. P. 16. "Several authors have pointed out that some corruption might be desirable." 
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 12, at 600. 
36. Becker & Stigler, supra note 4, at 6. 
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17). Bribers cannot be sure that what they-are ipaying for will be deliv­
ered, and payments made firm by firm' "result in a wide variance in 
conditions across firms" (p. 17). On the bribee side, corruption can 
"hold back state reform" (p. 17), and it "undermines the legitimacy of 
government" (p. 26). 
These propositions confound the cause with the symptom. Corrup­
tion in the Warsaw Ghetto indicated the lack of certainty Jews faced. 
But the bribes hardly created the lack of certainty; they manifested it. 
Likewise, the entire atrocity that was the Warsaw Ghetto could only 
"undermine the legitimacy" of the Nazi government. Bribery in the 
face of illegal abortion or banned drag shows illustrates the same 
point. Bribes often solve a problem, not cause it. 
The real problem is the size and power of government. The surest 
way to reduce corruption is to reduce government. Professor Rose­
Ackerman disagrees, briefly but emphatically: "[A] general program 
to shrink the size of government will not necessarily reduce corrup­
tion" (p. 41 ). The support for that position is a short (fourteen-page) 
paper Professor Rose-Ackerman published in a Spanish-language 
journal.37 The book disposes of the entire subject in fewer than two 
pages. Given that this position is contrary to that of almost all econo­
mists,38 Corruption and Government's cursory treatment of the issue is 
disappointing. 
The book's reasons why reducing government will not reduce cor-
ruption are confusing. 
Recall that scarcity produces corrupt incentives, and notice that reduc­
tions in government spending can produce scarcity when spending pro­
grams are cut or when regulatory budgets fall with no change in the un­
derlying statutes. Even worse, if a government under fiscal pressure cuts 
back spending, it may at the same time seek to maintain its influence by 
increasing regulations and mandates. The result can be increased corrup­
tion. [p. 41] 
But how is this a "general program to shrink the size of government"? 
In her example, government reduces "regulatory budgets" but corrup-
37. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Una Administracion Reducida Significa una Administracion 
Mas Limpia?, 145 NUEVA SOCIEDAD 66 (1996). 
38. This view is also contrary to many non-economists who focus on corruption. J.D. 
Pope of Transparency International (TI), the international corruption-monitoring organiza­
tion located in Berlin, notes that the sort of program Professor Rose-Ackerman advocates -
enforce the laws, or reform them and enforce them - hardly constitutes the full range of 
possible or desirable solutions to corruption: 
Countering corruption cannot be simply a matter of enacting laws, it is a matter of making 
systems work. It involves changing the way people behave - and this can only be done by 
altering the environment in which they are behaving. There are four broad scenarios when it 
comes to tackling systematic corruption. This first is a good, old-fashioned revolution. 
Jeremy D. Pope, Transparency International and the Drive Against Corruption, in 
CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 225, 231 
(Ayodele Aderinwale ed., 1995). 
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tion nevertheless ensues because government seeks "to maintain its 
influence by increasing regulations and mandates." The same govern­
ment that had the same regulatory powers before is "increasing gov­
ernment regulations and mandates." 
Some of the problem may ,be .a misunderstanding of how to meas­
ure the size and power of government. Professor Rose-Ackerman 
gives the following explanation why shrinking government can actu­
ally increase corruption: 
[A]n overall contraction in the size of the government budget may simply 
make government benefits scarcer. Corruption may then increase a:s po­
tential beneficiaries compete for the increasingly scarce pool of benefits. 
Spending cuts accompanied by increases in regulations may simply shift 
the locus of corruption. It is not enough for a country to get its macro­
economic totals in line with IMF guidelines. Nations should be con­
cerned with the underlying structure of public programs, not just the size 
of government. [p. 42] 
The book seemingly equates reducing the size and power of govern­
ment with reducing government spending. But corruption has no nec­
essary relation to government spending or government budgets. 
Purely public corruption is official theft that occurs off the books. In 
public-private corruption, payments made to public officials for special 
favors (rent seeking) or to avoid government imposition of costs (rent 
extraction) are likewise off the books. 
A similar confusion pervades the book's attitude toward privatiza­
tion. If the size and power of government are principal factors both in 
purely public corruption and in public-private corruption, one obvious 
solution would be privatizing functions that need not be performed by 
government (and often are not, outside the Third World). Not so, the 
book says (pp. 35-38). Privatization may be a sham, with the firm 
owned by the kleptocrat's family (as in Suharto's Indonesia). A gov­
ernment that is strong enough to steal from the fisc is strong enough to 
force payments from private firms. But privatization that maintains re­
sources in the kleptocrats' hands, or leaves him free to take from the 
private firm the way he did from the treasury, is not what most people 
mean by privatization. Government maintains economic control over 
the resources concerned; its discretionary authority - the source of 
corruption - is unchanged. True privatization goes unanalyzed. 
Ill. CORRUPTION, GOVERNMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Why does Corruption and Government almost categorically refuse 
to consider reducing government as a solution to corruption? One rea­
son may be the author's World Bank experience, which left such an 
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impression.39 Almost all the book concerns corruption abroad, based 
on a large library of studies produced by, for, or in conjunction with 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other inter­
national organizations. For these organizations, providing financial 
support to Third World governments, corruption is a touchy subject. 
Professor Rose-Ackerman reports of her year at the World Bank: 
It was fascinating to work on a topic - corruption - that the Bank had 
treated with indirection in the past. I began to collect euphemisms. Peo­
ple told me that when a review of a program mentioned "governance 
problems," "unexpected cost overruns," or "excessive purchase of vehi­
cles," this meant that corruption and simple theft were a problem. A 
World Bank staffer pointed out that complaints about "excessive capital­
labor ratios" in a report on Indonesia meant that corruption was not only 
rife but costly. [pp. xi-xii] 
The book says little about why corruption is so ticklish a subject that 
circumlocution is required. But it is not hard to understand why. In­
ternational agencies actually increase the amount of international cor­
ruption. 
Recall that illegal corruption is a function of the gains available 
from crime. International agencies exist to funnel bags of money to 
foreign governments. 
From the [World Bank's] creation in 1946 until the late 1960s, it was a 
conservative institution . . . .  Then, in 1968, Robert McNamara became 
bank president and dedicated himself to continually raising loan levels. 
By 1981, when McNamara resigned, lending had increased more than 13-
. fold, from $883 million to $12 billion. Loan levels have continued soar­
ing . . . .  According to the bank's own auditors, bank projects have suf­
fered from "unseemly pressure" to lend more money.40 . 
These numbers are perhaps small potatoes by Western standards. 
They are often astronomical, however, relative to overall economic ac­
tivity in the recipient nation.41 If corruption is a positive function of the 
amounts of money available to corrupt, then international agencies 
are responsible for an increase in corruption. 
Moreover, international bureaucrats are like any others: what ex­
pands their budgets is good for them.42 To keep the money coming 
39. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
40. James Bovard, The World Bank and the Impoverishment of Nations, in 
PERPETUATING POVERTY 59 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 1994) (citing WORLD 
BANK, TwELFTH ANNUAL REVIEW OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE RESULTS 48 (1987) ) .  
41 .  E.g. , Doug Bandow, Foreign Aid Doesn't Work, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, May 14, 1997, 
at 6 ("In some years, assistance accounted for as much as 30% o(the GDP of the recipient 
state. Over the entire period, aid was 10% of Haiti's GDP, 15 % of Burundi's and Rwanda's, 
and nearly 20% of Chad's.") .. 
42. The classic citation is WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND BUDGETS 
(1971). For the wealth of work done thereafter, see DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 
250-57 (1989). 
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from donor nations/international organizations need the donee states 
to accept the money offeted.43 International agencies therefore have 
generally deferred to foreign governments (meaning, often, dictators) 
in the projects that they underwrite. The IMF "remains politically de­
pendent on the very government's to whom it lends."44 Says one World 
Bank official from Ghana:· "We do not have Bank projects in Africa. 
Rather, we work with the governments to do what they believe is best 
for their development aspirations."45 
With so much money and a desire to work with national govern­
ments, international-agency involvement in underdeveloped econo­
mies has often resulted in economic disaster. This has been due, in 
particular, to agency preferences for lending to corrupt socialistic 
economies.46 
In nations like Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire, foreign assistance 
subsidized autocratic and corrupt dictators who consciously wrecked 
their nations. This has made reform even more difficult. Argues Alex De 
Waal, one-time vice director of Africa Watch: Aid "is structurally bad 
because all forms of relief undermine the incentive to take responsibility. 
The more aid a country receives, the less the government of that country 
has to answer to the people." . . .  Michael Maren, who has worked for the 
Peace Corps, Catholic Relief Services and U.S. AID, says that the food 
program there "was working to prop up a corrupt dictator and turn no­
mads into relief junkies."47 
43. Roland Vaubel, The Political Economy of the IMF: A Public Choice Analysis, in 
PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 40 at 55 ("All this is not to deny that many dedicated 
civil servants work at the IMF. But they are exposed to a perverse bureaucratic incen� 
tive . . . .  (E]xpanding their institution is where their interests meet." (citation omitted)). 
44. Id. at 47. 
45. W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Colloquy, The Role of Multi-Lateral Institutions in African 
Development, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 697, 698 (1999) (remarks of W. Paatii Ofosu­
Amaah, Chief Counsel, Africa Division, World Bank Legal Department); see also Michael 
M. Phillips, IMF Makes a Push for Good Government, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1999, at A2 
("(I]t will be difficult for the World Bank and IMF to fully implement the new [anti­
corruption] policy, partly because they are owned by the very governments whose integrity 
and effectiveness are in questions."). 
46. "Almost everyone in the policy community today acknowledges that market­
friendly economic policies are critical for growth. Aid officials have often not disagreed, but 
have tried arguing that aid money can induce countries to move to market. Foreign transfers 
more often subsidize economic failure, however - witness Russia." Doug Bandow, Aid 
Prolongs Third World Poverty, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Aug. 20, 1999, at 6; see also Hugh 
Pope, Corruption Stunts Growth in Ex-Soviet States, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2000, at A17. 
47. Id; see Michael Maren, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE RAVAGING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN 
AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (1997). Maren's firsthand account is as searing as its 
title indicates. See also Michael Maren, Manna From Heaven? Somalia Pays the Price for 
Years of Aid, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 19, 1993, at 23; Alex de Waal & Rakiya Omaar, Doing 
Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia, CURRENT HISTORY, May 
1993, at 198 (authored by the co-directors of African Rights, a human rights group in 
London). 
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Perennially, the agencies promise they will irr.iprove. -But economists 
Alberto Alesian and Beatrice Weder report in a study for the National 
Bureau for Economic Research that "more corrupt governments still 
tend to receive more aid. "48 
International agencies' tendency to corrupt is seen in their contin­
ued preferences for the Big Project in borrower (donee) nations.49 
Purely as a way toward economic development, big projects (dams, 
roads, ports) are suspect.50 Efficient development starts with private 
entrepreneurship; therefore donors can do more good by getting the 
national government off local entrepreneurs' backs.51 The Big Project 
puts money into the hands of national . authorities, increasing their 
power and so converting "aid" into a development obstacle.52 
If so, why does self-defeating aid in the form of Big Projects con­
tinue? Because politicians, even in developed nations without interna-
48. Bandow, supra note 46; see also George B.N. Ayittey, How the Multilateral Institu­
tions Compounded Africa's Economic Crisis, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 585 (1999). 
49. In discussing "projects normally financed through bank credits or, in the case of ex­
ternal aid, through concessional credits," a former dii-ector-general of development at the 
European Commission writes: 
The disastrous effect of corruption reaches its highest point when the conception and even­
tually the choice of a project are determined by corruption. By conception, I mean the ac­
quisition of inappropriate technology to the needs of the country or the choice of project 
lays more emphasis on capital, often more rewarding in corrupt terms than that based on 
manpower which would be more useful for development . . . .  I would like to quote Remi 
Godeau in Jeune Afrique of July 94: "Africa is larded with abandoned motor-ways eaten 
away by the savannah, factories down the drain hardly some few years upon taking off, im­
passable rail lines due to lack of maintenance, hydro-electric dams abandoned due to lack of 
profitability. 
Dieter Frisch, Effects of Corruption on Development, in CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN WEST AFRICA 59 (1994). 
50. Michael M. Phillips, Hippocratic Oath: Can World Bank Lend Money to Third 
World Without Hurting Poor?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2000, at Al:  
World Bank officials took a Hippocratic oath when they agreed in 1997 to lend India more 
than a half-billion dollars to mine coal. Above all, the bank officials swore to themselves, the 
project would do no harm . . . .  World Bank officials concede that, once again, one of their 
massive Third World investments has exacted a severe toll on citizens whose lives ultimately 
were supposed to have been made better . . .  Still, bank officials continue to see the big proj­
ects as necessary for nurturing fragile economies. "These are the bread and butter of the 
bank historically," and it doesn't intend to back away from them, says Mr. Lim [World Bank 
director for India]. 
51 .  HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE 
THIRD WORLD (1989); Cheung, supra note 8. Ayittey, supra note 48, at 588, writes: 
[A] distinction should always be made between African leaders and people. For example, the 
expression "the U.S. is helping Africans develop their economies" is very misleading. Whom 
does the U.S. help - African leaders or people? The two are not necessarily synonymous, 
but there often exists an erroneous presumption that helping African leaders necessarily 
helps the people. The leadership has been the problem, not the people. Despite this, the 
West. continues to invest heavily in African leaders. 
52. Professor Rose-Ackerman understands this. Early in the book she warns against 
corruption's encouragement of "excessive public infrastructure investment" (p. 3), and 
closes by warning against "state sponsorship of massive infrastructure projects that are too 
large and complex" (p. 228). 
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tional aid, prefer tli'e Big Project. Politicians find it useful to bestow 
large rewards on their deserving (i.e., rent seeking) constituents. Big 
Projects do a better job of pinpointing the deserving constituents. In 
the United States, for example, the Army Corps of Engineers is the 
king of Big Project agencies, and receives unrivaled political backing.53 
Even agencies like the U.S. Forest Service find that building roads, not 
forests, is the way to go.54 
More important, the Big Project also facilitates corruption. Profes­
sor Rose-Ackerman herself agrees that "[c]orrupt payments to win 
major contracts and concessions are generally the preserve of large 
businesses and high-level officials" (p. 27). So, why not reduce corrup­
tion by ending the emphasis on Big Projects and decentralizing foreign 
aid? Alas, national governments, the "high-level officials," and klepto­
crats to whom Professor Rose-Ackerman refers, do not want little 
projects. Without national government agreement on what interna­
tional agencies give, the agencies have no projects at all. 
Personally, Professor Rose-Ackerman probably would agree with 
this assessment. But Corruption and Government is hardly more eager 
to confront the systemic deficiencies directly than those World Bank 
employees whose euphemisms she reports. Chapter Ten covers "The 
Role of the International Community" in reducing corruption. She 
says that in the World Bank, "[c]orruption is no longer a taboo sub­
ject" (p. 196). But to her, it is not something that international agen­
cies cause, either. Corruption is something that happens to the World 
Bank and its money, not something that its money might actually be 
responsible for. Agencies are victims, too. 
A serious attempt to deal with the subject will require confrontations 
with many borrowers and with lenders whose own firms pay bribes in de­
veloping countries. The World Bank's own difficulties are easy to see in 
their policy document Helping Countries Combat Corruption . . . . Yet 
53. E.g. , Michael Grunwald, Working to Please Hill Commanders, WASH. POST, Sept. 
11 ,  2000, at Al: 
What does the Army Corps of Engineers do in Mississippi? Generally, whatever Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Thad Cochran 
want it to do . . . .  Lott and Cochran have directed the Corps to supply water to major indus­
tries in Lott's home town of Pascagoula and to raise the Mississippi River levees. They are 
pushing the Corps to dredge harbors in Pascagoula and Gulfport and a marina at a northern 
Mississippi lake resort. They moved the local Corps district to a sprawling campus that one 
agency memo called the TajMaVicksburg. 
54. BILL BRYSON, A WALK IN THE WOODS 46-47 (1998): 
The Forest Service is truly an extraordinary institution. A lot of people, seeing that word 
forest in the title, assume it has something to do with looking after trees. In fact, no -
though that was the original plan . . . .  In fact, mostly what the Forest Services does is build 
roads. I am not kidding. There are 378,000 miles of roads in America's national forests. That 
may seem a meaningless figure, but look at it this way - it is eight times the total mileage of 
America's interstate highway system. It is the largest road system in the world in the control 
of a single body . . . .  It is the avowed aim of the U.S. Forest Service to construct 580,000 
miles of additional forest road by the middle of the next century. 
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change cannot occur unless countries acknowledge the problem and deal 
with it . . . .  [p. 197; citation omitted] 
In football, the best defense is a good offense. International agen­
cies now work hard to create an image of themselves as corruption­
busters.55 The book toes this line. 
The previous chapters outlined the steps that a reform-minded gov­
ernment can take to reduce corruption. International aid and lending 
agencies should start with such a framework and work with individual 
countries to develop a realistic program . . . .  Existing attempts include 
the provision of resources and technical assistance to ease the transition 
to a competent, less numerous, and well-paid civil service system. The 
success of such efforts has been mixed and not always very durable, but 
the effort needs to be continued - especially if the World Bank can 
learn from some of its past failures.56 
This slant played well during the recent public-relations difficulties 
experienced by these agencies.57 But it comes off as remarkably similar 
to Budweiser's public-relations campaign exhorting responsible 
drinking - the similarity not diminished by episodes of alleged cor­
ruption within the World Bank itself,58 and in other aid-related pro­
grams.59 
55. Bandow, Foreign Aid Doesn't Work, supra note 41: "Rather than dismantle failed 
programs, however, government agencies and multilateral organizations have been con­
cocting new justifications for more of the same." Sometimes, though, busting corruption 
simply means stanching the flow of international money to corrupt countries, a tacit admis­
sion that the corruption was linked to the money in the first place. See Phillips, IMF Makes a 
Push for Good Government, supra note 45. 
56. Pp. 183-84 (citation omitted). For another example of the perspective that corrup­
tion just happens and then creates problems for international financial agencies, see Nancy 
Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Are International Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 98 (1996). 
57. Last April, when several different organizations demonstrated and rioted against the 
World Bank and IMF in Washington, USA Today editorialized in favor of these organiza­
tions. 
In the past several years, these institutions have been reforming themselves. The IMF is be­
coming less secretive in its practices, and auditing its loans better so borrowers can't 
steal. . . .  
And both institutions are on the right path in using their clout to help root out corruption 
in the countries to which they provide loans. 
Editorial, Protesters Target Institutions Most Able to Help the Poor, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2000, at 14A. 
58. William Murray, World Bank Investigating Possible Embezzlement, WALL ST. J., 
July 17, 1998, at A12 (reporting that the World Bank "has found evidence of possible kick­
backs and embezzlement at the international antipoverty institution" and that, in 1996, "the 
Bank prosecuted [an] employee . . .  for stealing about $500,000 by falsifying travel ac­
counts"). 
59. E.g. , Pamela Ferdinand, U.S. Sues Harvard over Russia Aid Project, WASH . POST, 
Sept. 27, 2000, at A21 (reporting that the United States was seeking $120 million in damages 
in a suit against Harvard University alleging fraud by Harvard employees in contracts 
Harvard had with U.S. Agency for International Development concerning development 
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An agency that provides the .booty to foreign governments - some 
of them those same kleptocrats that Professor Rose-Ackerman wrote 
about a hundred pages earlier - cannot pretend that corruption 
strikes like lightning thereafter. (Imagine Budweiser's announcing a 
new campaign to give away free beer to people promising to drink re­
sponsibly.) As both politic'al parties in the recent debate over welfare 
reform in America have acknowledged, more welfare money leads to 
more welfare abuse; one sure way to cut welfare abuse is to cut the 
amount of welfare available. 
Both economically and legally, actors are deemed to intend the 
foreseeable consequences of their acts. When the World Bank 
(Agency for International Development, United Nations, whatever) 
ships in the bullion, it knows that at least part of what it will get is cor­
ruption. The past is often the best indication.60 In 1999, "U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin acknowledged in congressional testimony that 
much of the $4.8 billion that the IMF provided Russia last year 'may 
have been siphoned off improperly.' "61 
Corruption and Government is right to decry all of this. But antipa­
thy is not analysis. As a self-described work of economics, the book 
must confront the unfortunate fact that government power makes pos­
sible corruption, and that international bodies working through na­
tional government powers provoke more corruption. The real ques­
tion is whether international agencies that, willy-nilly, foster 
corruption among whatever else they achieve have other benefits ex­
ceeding their costs.62 Many analysts, surveying international bodies' 
subsidization of corruption and dictatorial socialism, would answer no, 
including some analysts at the agencies themselves.63 But that issue, 
obviously important, goes beyond Professor Rose-Ackerman's book. 
projects in Russia); see also Editorial, Harvard on the Volga, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at 
18. 
60. Bandow, supra note 41 ("(T]he U.S. Agency for International Development . . .  ad­
mitted that 'much of the investment financed by (the U.S.] and other donors between 1960 
and 1980 has disappeared without a trace.' " (quoting USAID report)). 
61. Phillips, supra note 45. 
62. If one last analogy is permitted, consider laws against drugs (or, formerly, alcohol). 
No one likes debilitating addiction any more than one likes welfare-decreasing corruption. 
But reducing addiction by outlawing drugs increases the number of murders. The positive 
correlation between prohibition (of drugs or alcohol) and murder does not mean that people 
could not conclude that prohibition is nonetheless worth all the murders. But it would be 
unreasonable to pretend that more prohibition does not degenerate into more murder, and 
thus to evaluate prohibition benefits without including the associated murder costs. 
63. E.g., MAREN, supra note 47; Bandow, supra note 41 ("All too often, [recipients] 
were aid-backed regimes that were not only corrupt but collectivist."); Joseph Kahn, World 
Bank Cites Itself in Study of Africa's Bleak Performance, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2000, at A9 
(referring to joint World Bank report with the United Nations and African development 
institutions). 
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IV. CONCLUSION · 
I 
In critiquing and sometimes criticizing a book like Corruption and 
Government, one risks being misunderstood. Nothing in this Review 
should suggest that legal reform to • stem malign corruption is rear­
ranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Things like reforming procure­
ment laws or increasing bureaucrats' salaries may well have benefits 
exceeding their costs.64 To the extent that such solutions would reduce 
bad corruption, they should be, and are, applauded. 
But if one sincerely wants to reduce bad corruption - and no one 
can doubt Professor Rose-Ackerman's dedication to eradicating cor­
ruption - other fundamental points are missing or underemphasized 
in this book. 
First, there is that iceberg, government. Corruption and Govern­
ment overplays corruption's manifestations and underplays govern­
ment's role. Government is the real cause of corruption, and a book 
on corruption cannot treat the subject without a model that includes 
its size and power. A book about corruption written from an economic 
perspective must recognize that, while all corruption is by definition 
illegal, that does not make it bad economically. 
Finally, the role of international agencies in all this analysis needs 
more attention. Far from being mere victims of corruption, agencies 
are frequently to blame for it. They keep giving kleptocrats money. 
And therein lies much of the tale. 
64. For some reports that reforms may be having the desired effects, see Phillips, supra 
note 45 ("More than two dozen countries, from Russia to Paraguary, have asked for the 
bank's help in combating corruption. It's become 'politically correct to request assistance,' 
says Daniel Kaufmann, who works on the bank's anticorruption outreach. 'The question is 
how to ascertain seriousness,' he says."). 
